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its economic, political, and military might. But can the U.S. maintain its unique posi-
tion in the 21st century or is the American empire 0 11 the ropes? This article discusses 
two different interpretations of the U.S. position as the world'.f only supe1powe1; what 
challenges it is facing, and what nations are most likely lo he its challengers in the 
global arena. The author argues that the U.S. will co111inue to be the world's leading 
actor for the foreseeable future but that it is a fragile superpowe1; one whose future 
fate will be determined by how the country manages to deal with a number of chal-
lenges and problems. These challenges include relations with the growth economies of 
Asia, above all China, and problems with the domestic economy, the enormousfederal 
budget deficit, and the stronf? political polarization in Washington , D.C. 
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By 1890, the United States had overtaken Great Britain as the world 's lead-
ing economy, but in military and diplomatic terms it was still a secondary 
power. 1 In those days the U.S. aimy ranked fourteenth in the world, after 
Bulgaria's. Its navy was about one-eighth the size of Italy's, despite the 
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fact that its industrial strength was by then thirteen times bigger. The U.S. 
participated in few international meetings, and its capital was a small town 
with a small government focused mainly on domestic affairs. Despite its 
growing economic strength, this was not a country focused on the outside 
world. But by World War I, when the U.S . economy was already twice the 
size of Britain's, presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson 
had begun to define the U.S. as a global power.2 And in 1941, publi shing 
magnate Hemy Luce penned a famous article in Life magazine declaring 
the 201h century the "American Century."3 
When the United States entered World War II, it was a lready well 
on its way to becoming a superpower. Today the U.S. has Jong held 
a dominant position in economic, political, and cultural terms and ac-
counts for nearly half of the world 's aggregate military expenditures on 
its own. The country spends more on research and development in the 
defense sector than all other nations put together. In 2006 the U.S . had 
766 military bases in 40 countries and a dozen nuclear-armed a ircraft 
carriers continuously patrolling the global seas. The People's Republic 
of China, which aspires to global leadership, did not have a single such 
vessel at that time (they now have one). Economically, no country can 
compete with the U.S., and the impact of its popular culture is hard to 
exaggerate.4 
But in the Jong run, can the United States maintain its unique position in 
the 21st century? Will the 2000s also be an "American century," or will the 
American empire , like many former empires throughout history, gradually 
lose its power and influence? Is the American empire on the ropes? If so, 
what present-day great power will take its place over time?5 The conver-
sation about these types of questions has been extensive in recent years, 
especially following the events of September 11, 2001 , and the subsequent 
2 Farced Zakaria, The Pos1-A111erica11 World (New York : W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 165 f., 174. 
3 For a recent biography of Luce, sec Alan Brinkley, 7/1e Publisher: He111y Luce a11d I !is America11 Ce11/11ry 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 20 I 0). 
4 Zakaria. Tile Past-American World, 181 f., 237 f. ; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: 11ze Rise a11d Fall of the 
American Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 15 ff. See a lso Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows 
afZakaria, The Pox1-America11 World, 181 f., 237 f.; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise a11d Fall of the 
American Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 15 ff. Sec also Chalmers Johnson, Tlte Sormiv.< of 
Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and rite E11d of the Republic (New York: Henry Holl and Company, 2004), l 
ff., 288. 
5 Cf. Niall Ferguson, "Complexity and Collapse: Empires on the Edge of Chaos," Forei1111 Affairs, March/ 
April, 20 10, 18-32. 
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wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the deep economic crisis that hit 
the world starting in 2007. 
In what fo ll ows, T will review two different interpretations of the U.S. 
position as the world's only superpower, what challenges it is facing, and 
what nations are most likely to be its challengers in the world arena. Both 
interpretations predict the inevitable end of the Ameri can era, but they pres-
ent very different ideas as to which nation will replace the United States as 
the world's leading superpower. My own thesis is that the U.S. will con-
tinue to be the world's leading global actor for the foreseeable future but 
that it is a fragile superpower, one whose future fate will be determined by 
how the cou ntry manages to deal with a number of major challenges and 
soc i::1l problems. These ch::1Jlenges include relations with the growth econo-
mies of Asia, above all China, and problems with the domestic economy, 
the enormous federal budget deficit, and the strong political polarization in 
Washington, D.C. 
Many factors indicate that the foremost threat to U.S. supremacy in the 
short term comes not from the outside but from within the country. But let 
us first look at the foreign policy challenges. 
The European Challenge 
Charles A. Kupchan is a professor of international relations at Georgetown 
University. In 2002 he published a major study called The End of the Ameri-
can Era, reissued in paperback in November, 2003. The point of departure 
for his book is the conventional one, namely that the U.S. is presently the 
fully dominant power in the world. No country even comes close to the pow-
er of the U.S., symbolized by the might of its economy and its military, its 
capacity for technological innovation, and the dominance of its popuhu- cul-
ture. But as the title of the book indicates, this is an illusory superiority that 
obscures the fragility of the international system and the fact that the posi-
tion of the U.S. is ah-eady being threatened by several up-and-coming states 
that would like nothing better than to appropriate some of the giant's power. 
According to Kupchan, the prime threat comes from the European Union, 
whose continued economic and political integration impresses him greatly. 
The EU's collective prospeiity is already on a par with that of the U.S., it is 
argued, and its will to make joint use of its resources is already "altering the 
global landscape." Here is how he describes a development that he feels has 
been gravely underestimated in his own country: 
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The integration of Europe is one of the most significant geopolitical events of the twen-
tieth century. It represents a turning point every bit as momentous as the founding of 
the United States as a federal union, perhaps more so. Europe has taken history into its 
hands and is sculpting its own landscape. After centuries of rivalry and bloodshed among 
competing poles, the Europeans have had enough. They are in the midst of a revolution-
ary process of geopolitical engineering aimed at merging these competing polities into a 
collective whole, eliminating once and for all war among Europe's national states. 
In Kupchan's world, the leading nations are caught up in a constant struggle 
for global power, resources, and status. The international order, which was 
long predicated on the hegemony of the U.S., will gradually be succeeded 
by a new showdown about power. And that strnggle will primaril y pit the 
U.S. against a unified Europe. In the long term, Asia, led by China, also 
constitutes a threat, but the immediate danger is presented by an ever more 
united EU. As Kupchan sees it, it is erroneous to view Europe and the U.S. 
as perennial best friends. The fact that this was the case for several decades 
following World War IJ was due to the Europeans' need for help from the 
U.S . to deter the Soviet threat. After the end of the Cold War, the situa-
tion is different- now the two continents will be entering a classic power 
struggle that the U.S. is poorly prepared to wage. To survive in a future 
world consisting of many different power centers, the U.S. needs to develop 
"a new liberal internationalism" made up of what Kupchan calls "strategic 
restraint, institutions, and social integration." Only with such a "grand strat-
egy" as this will the U.S. be able to fend off its competitors.6 
Today it is evident that Kupchan greatly overestimated the strength and 
stability of the EU's economy as well as its ambitions to attain power. He 
also describes the continent as more homogeneous and unified than it actu-
ally is. Taking his cue from the neorealist approach in international rela-
tions theory, Kupchan overlooks the fact that a great power, which today's 
EU undoubtedly is despite its current economic woes, does not necessarily 
need to aspire to being a superpower. Some great powers have that ambi-
tion, while others do not. The example of Japan is particularly interesting 
in this connection. When the Japanese economy was at its strongest in the 
1980s and it was thought for a time that Japan posed a true threat to the 
U.S., that nation could very well have determined to try to reach super-
power status. But the Japanese chose not to do so-a majority of citizens 
6 Charles A. Kupchan, The End oft/re American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitic~ of tlie Twenty-
first Century (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), quotes on 119, 132, 263. 
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lack the will to identify their nation today even as a normal great power and 
support the pacifist Article 9 in their constitution and a generall y restrained 
role for their military defense.7 
This also seems to be the case with today's EU. It is true that most of 
the states in the Union are eager to take up the competition with the U.S. 
in the realms of the economy, trade, education, science, and technology-
in these fields there are programs and developmental plans pouring out of 
Brussels, produced by well-paid bureaucrats. But the EU lacks the same 
will and capacity when it comes to building up a joint military force. The 
issue divides the member countries, and the tiny European interventionary 
force that presently ex ists is primarily intended for use in humanitarian and 
peacemaking assignments in various crisis areas. 
A great power must have a certain amount of resources to be counted in 
the category of superpower. They include a certain geographic and popu-
lation size, an advanced industrial economy, a strong defense (including 
nuclear weapons), and fu nctioning political institutions capable of conduct-
ing a robust and uniform defense and foreign policy. The EU lives up to the 
demands in terms of geography, population, and economy, but fails when 
it comes to commitment to a joint defense and the efficacy of its political 
institutions.8 Military strength is an absolutely vital part of a superpower's 
arsenal , and here the EU's insufficiencies are clearly apparent. To be able to 
evolve from a great power to a superpower, there needs to be a will to build 
up a considerable joint military capabil ity. No such will exists in most of 
today's EU countries, especially in nuclear powers like the UK and France, 
who prioritize their established defense cooperation with NATO. Even if 
EU leaders were to decide on a joint defense commitment, just as was the 
case in Japan, they would encounter insurmountable difficulties in gaining 
the acceptance of their citizens. The awareness that two world wars started 
on European soil lingers as an effective countervailing force against milita-
rism and increased armament. Regarding the view of the need for a strong 
defense, there is a stark cultural difference between Europe and the U.S. 
The EU also lacks the will or, indeed, any motive to pursue a confronta-
tional foreign policy vis-a-vis the presently dominant superpower. To make 
his reasoning seem compell ing, Kupchan exaggerates the EU 's interest in 
7 Cf. Barry Buzan, The V11i1ed Swtes and rhe Great Powers: World Politics in tile Twenty-Firs/ Ce111wy 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2004), IO I, 111 ff. 
8 Ibid., 116 ff. 
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building up a strong joint defense and the risks of growing geopolitical 
rivalry between Europe and the U.S. To be sure, the Iraq war led to periodi-
cally strong antagonism between the Bush administration and some of the 
EU's leading countries, primarily France and Germany, but the tensions 
abated once the invasion was over. Under President Barack Obama rela-
tions between the two continents are once again characterized by trust and 
cooperation, not by disputes. Nothing indicates that there is any risk what-
soever of armed conflict between the U.S. and Europe. 
Moreover, Kupchan underestimates the EU's ability to deal with the 
problems of immigration and refugees and has an overly sanguine view 
of the euro. For instance, he puts far too much stock in the EU-positive 
agenda of the British Labour Party and egregiously misjudges the stiff 
resistance of Britons to introducing the euro in the UK. After the establish-
ment of a new coalition government in May 2010, we have seen a much 
more reserved British policy vis-a-vis the EU. The government is domi-
nated by the dyed-in-the-wool EU-skeptical Tory Party, which has prom-
ised to keep the country outside the euro. The ravages of the economic 
crisis in Greece and other EU countries in 2009-11 furthermore showed 
how shaky the entire euro project is and how hard it was for the leading 
EU countries to rapidly come to the aid of others in a situation where one 
of the member countries was facing the threat of immediate bankruptcy in 
its state finances. 9 
With the adoption of the new EU Constitution, the Union has acquired an 
instrument that can facilitate more rapid and forceful action. But the EU's 
dominating nations retain great independence in defense and foreign-policy 
matters, and it will probably take a very long time, if it ever happens, before 
the EU can even approach the U.S. as a global actor. As the social scientist 
Ban-y Buzan has noted, the EU will continue to be a loose confederation 
primarily characterized by the fact that it is a civil, not a military, great 
power. A great power with no significant military of its own cannot become 
a superpower. 10 
9 Cf. Niall Ferguson, "The End of the Euro," Ne1vsweek, May 17, 2010; Paul Krugman, "The Euro Trap," The 
New fork Times, April 29, 2010. 
I 0 Buzan, The United States a11d the Great Powers, 118 f. 
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The Chinese Challenge 
If the EU succeeds in dealing with the aftermath of the economic crisis, it 
will most probably regain some of its potency.11 Today, however, it is much 
more corrunon to nominate China as the coming challenger for the title of 
the world's mightiest nation. It is not difficul t to see why. In terms of area, 
China and the U.S. are virtually equally large, but China has more than 
four times as many inhabitants, or about 1.3 billion, the majority of whom 
(64 percent) live in rural areas .12 Over the past thirty years, China has un-
dergone astonishingly rapid development, with average economic growth 
between nine and ten percent per year, the fastest ever recorded for a ma-
jor economy. Thereby some 400 million people have gone from poverty 
to relative prosperity, this too a world record of sorts. Since 1983 , China's 
share of the world 's economic output has risen from 4 to over 12 percent. 
S imilarly, its share of global exports has soared. Another measure of growth 
is that China now exports more products in a single day than it did in the 
entire year of 1978, when the refonn era of the day started following Deng 
Xiaoping 's historic speech in which he urged the communist regime to fo-
cus on economic development- in other words, capitalism and a market 
economy-and to forget about ideology. A further measure of the tempo of 
growth is that all 20 of the fastest-growing cities in the world are in China.13 
Against this backdrop it is hardly remarkable that many contemporary 
observers point to the Middle Kingdom as a future superpower. 14 Among 
the most opinionated of these is Martin Jacques, a B1itish journalist who 
is a visiting research fe llow at the London School of Economics Asia Re-
search Centre. Jacques has traveled extensively in East Asia and, among 
other things, has been a visiting professor at Renmin University in Beijing. 
11 ln recent years Kupchan seems to have changed his opinion about the EU. He now believes that "[!]he Eu-
ropean Union is dying-not a dramatic or sudden death, bu! one so slow and steady that we may f .. . ] soon 
[ ... ]realize that the project of' European integration that we've taken for granted over 1hc past half-century 
is no more." Charles Kupchan, "As nationalism rises, will the European Union fall?," The Washi11gto11 Post, 
August 29, 20 10. 
12 The figure of 1.3 billi on emanates from the 2000 census, but the 2010 census will mosl probably show a 
higher figure. 
13 Marlin Jacques, When China R11/es the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Westem 
World (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 3 ff.; Zakaria, The Post-American World, 88 IT.; Ferguson, Co/oss11s, 
260 f. 
14 See, for example, Henry Kissinger, On China (London: Allen Lane, 201 1); Joseph S. Nye, Tile F11t11re of 
Power (New York: Public Affairs, 201 1); Ki shore Mahbubani, The New Arian Hemisphere: The Irresistible 
Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008). 
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The title of his book When China Rules the World largely sums up the au-
thor's standpoint. Jacques argues that China is well on its way to becoming 
the globe's dominant superpower and that this wi ll have far-reaching conse-
quences for the world . Unlike earlier global giants such as Britain, Genna-
ny, or the U.S ., today 's China does not stand out as a powerful nation state. 
Instead, it is an ancient civilization that after spending many centuries in 
the periphery is now on track to regaining its rightful international position. 
As Jacques sees it, the modernization and record growth of China from 
the 1980s will not only relegate the U.S. to a second-place rank. With time 
the entire western world will be marginalized as a center of power. And the 
Chinese do not follow the same rulebook as Americans and Europeans. By 
dint of it<; several thousand years of history and its unique cultural character-
istics, China will blaze its own path to greater modernization and not emulate 
western countries. This is something that western powers, in their myopia, 
have yet to realize. According to Jacques, they still imagine that China wi ll 
become a western nation with the standard ingredients of free democratic 
elections, an independent judiciary, a free press, and a convertible currency. 
But what we are witnessing today is something entirely different, namely the 
emergence of "a world of multiple and competing modernities" that, spear-
headed by China, deviate considerably from the western model. 
Martin Jacques goes very far in his predictions about coming develop-
ments. He refers to calculations from the investment bank Goldman Sachs 
that forecast that China wi ll surpass the U.S. as the world's largest economy 
as early as 2027. The deep financial crisis that was triggered in September 
2008 indicates that the U.S. is no longer sufficiently strong to guarantee to-
day's international economic system and to sustain the dollar as the world's 
reserve currency. The dwindling value of the dollar renders it substantially 
more expensive for the U.S. to maintain its status as a superpower, and 
Jacques foresees that the Chinese yuan will ultimately come to replace the 
dollar as the world's leading currency, although this must be predicated 
on it being made convertible . The advance of China is evident not only in 
economic terms but also in political, military, and cultural spheres . Jacques 
also believes that it is merely a matter of time until Mandarin replaces Eng-
lish as the world's leading language. All in all , this is an unstoppable force 
whose ascendency is going to fundamentally transform the world. 15 
15 .Jacques, When China Rule~ rhe World, 3, 11 f. (yuotc on 11), 364, 384 ff. 
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Reading Jacques' book, one is reminded of a quotation usually ascribed 
to Napoleon Bonaparte: "Let China sleep, for when China wakes, she will 
shake the world." 16 The country's progress in the last few decades has been 
remarkable indeed, especially in terms of its economy, trade, and technolo-
gy. A fresh example is found in the automobile industry, which bas been the 
Ameiicans' showcase business forever. In 2009 China surpassed the U.S. 
for the first time, with sales of more than 13 million vehicles, although auto 
exports to Europe remain insignificant. 17 China's space program is secret 
but ambitious, and the goal seems to be to carry out a first manned moon 
landing by 2013. At the same time, NASA's budget has been slashed, and 
plans for an American journey to Mars have been put in mothballs. 18 
The People's Republic of China fulfill s several of the criteria for a su-
perpower, those concerning economy, geographic size, and population, in 
spades. But in terms of military strength, China- its nuclear weapons not-
withstanding-is still far behind the U.S., both as a matter of total weapons 
arsenals and spending on defense research. Official figures rank China in 
third place in the world regarding annual defense expenditures, after the 
U.S. and the UK. Jn reality the Beijing government probably spends con-
siderably more on defense than it is willing to admjt, but in one estimate 
its annual defense budget nevertheless amounts to at most 10 percent of the 
Pentagon's. 19 The political stability of the country is perhaps the factor that 
is the most difficult to judge for the future. 
China's foreign policy is officially based on the principle of peaceful 
coex istence and safeguarding national sovereignty. A cardinal precondition 
is the political dominance of the Communist Party and its supremacy in so-
ciety. Apace with its ongoing modernization, the country has become more 
and more active in international forums such as the UN, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC). 
Its leaders are fond of embellishing their speeches with lofty words like 
peace, harmony, stabili ty, and development.20 But the truly interesting ques-
tion is what objectives the giant country has in the long term. The behavior 
16 Zakaria, Tiie Post-A111erica11 World, 87 f. 
17 Torbjtirn Petersson, "Bilkris- men i Kina rusar forsilljningen," Dage11s Nyheter, economy sectio n, Decem-
ber 11 , 2009, 2 f. 
18 Rana Foroohar & Melinda Liu. "When China Rules the World," /lle111s111eek, March 22. 20 10, 29. 
19 Jacques, Wiien China 1?11/es the World, 5; Zakaria, The Pos1-A111erica11 World, 92, 126. 
20 Johan Lagcrkvist, Kina i globaliseri11ge11s mill (Stockholm: Bokfiirlagct DN, 2007), 163- 174. 
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of the Chinese leadership at the failed climate meeting in Copenhagen in 
December 2009 prov ides a glimpse of a more ambitious agenda. 
The journalist Mark Lynas covered the endgame of the climate negotia-
tions for The Guardian. His vantage point was unique, as he was associated 
with the delegation of one of the negotiating states and was therefore sitting 
in the same room as the heads of state and heads of government. Lynas 
claims that China intentionally saw to it that the discussions were derailed, 
for the purpose of placing the blame for their failure with western leaders, 
and Barack Obama in particular. The Chinese strategy involved firs t block-
ing negotiations for two weeks and thereafter ensuring that conversations 
behind closed doors came across as the bad-tempered western countries 
once again betraying the poor people of the world. The strategy succeed-
ed beyond their expectations. After the breakdown, representatives of aid 
agencies and environmental groups vied with each other to register their 
shrill condemnations of the behavior of the rich countries. But the truth was 
quite the opposite, according to Lynas, who provides a vivid insider account 
of the final negotiations. "China gutted the deal behind the scenes, and then 
left its proxies to savage it in public ."21 
Barack Obama in fact made desperate efforts to reach an agreement, but 
his Chinese counterparts answered him with "no" time after time. Many 
people no doubt recall the image of the world's leaders as they frantically 
attempted to piece together a positive result during the last hours of negoti-
ating. Besides Obama and then Danish Prime Minister Lars L~kke Rasmus-
sen, who was chairing the meeting, presidents and prime mini sters attended 
from more than a score of other countries. Only China lacked top-level 
representation-instead of their head of government, the rulers chose to 
send an unknown diplomat to be placed directly opposite Obama. It is not 
difficult to imagine what the Americans thought of that diplomatic move. 
On multiple occasions during the critical endgame, the assembled leaders 
of the world were forced to wait for the Chinese delegate to return to the 
negotiations after conferring with his superiors by phone. 
Premier Wen Jiabao was on site in Copenhagen, but did not deign to 
honor the negotiations with his presence. According to a centrally placed 
source, Wen is said not to have had a mandate to make any decisions at the 
meeting. Instead of attending in person, and thereby risking disclosure of 
2 1 Mark Lynas, "How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the room," The Guardian, 
December 23, 2009. 
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his lack of any mandate, Wen chose to send a replacement and stay away 
from the negotiating table. This is the behavior of a state that is conscious of 
its growing power and is not above using it for the state's own ends. 
Ahead of the meeting, the industrialized countries had pledged to re-
duce emissions of greenhouse gases 80 percent by 2050. In the draft agree-
ment, the long-term objective was given as a reduction of 50 percent by 
2050. China's delegate insisted that that objective be stricken from the 
fina l document, which was also done. To the despair of the negotiators, 
he even opposed any mention of other countries' own goals in the text. 
Language that global emissions were to peak in 2020 was a lso de leted 
and replaced by a vaguer formulation that better suited the Chinese. The 
reason the Chinese succeeded in their game plan, according to Lynas, was 
that they had an extraordinarily strong negotiating position, since they did 
not feel they needed a climate agreement, whereas other nations, with the 
exception of India and Saudi Arabia, with its o il , a ll wanted one with clear 
(albeit long-term) objecti ves. According to a seasoned observer, China, 
which is dependent on cheap coal for its growth, wanted as weak a climate 
agreement as possible in order to avoid having to face more ambitious 
cl imate goals in the fu ture. 
No head of state stood to gain more politically from a successful agree-
ment than Barack Obama. For the first time, the U.S. submitted a seriously 
intentioned climate objective that, while it may have been considered by 
many to be insufficient (a 17-percent reduction of carbon dioxide emis-
sions by 2020 with 2005 as the base year), nonetheless represented a shift 
in the American position compared with the Bush admi nistration. During 
the meeting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton fl agged for a $ 100 billion 
fund to assist developing countries in covering costs they mi ght incur in 
the transformation. For Obama it was also highly important to deliver tan-
gible results for his domestic audience, particularly for the many skeptical 
senators who would ultimately be the ones to determine whether the U.S. 
would ratify a coming climate agreement. This fu rther bolstered China's 
negotiating position, as did the fact that environmental groups directed all 
their demands to the rich industrialized countries.22 
An audio recording of the final negotiations that was published on the 
German magazine Der Spiegel's home page largely coIToborates Mark Ly-
22 Ibid.: Foroohur & Liu, "When China Rules the World," 30. 
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nas' observations.23 China's comportment during the Copenhagen meeting 
is a good illustration of one of the theses in Martin Jacques' book, namely 
that when necessary the country's leaders do not hesitate to make use of 
their own rulebook in important international negotiations. But otherwise 
there is every reason to be skeptical to Jacques' reasoning. His point of 
departme is the wobbly assumption that China's economy wi ll continue to 
grow at the same rapid rate over the coming 30-40 years as it has since the 
1980s. Such extrapolation into the future of recent trends is highly unreli-
able and actually nothing more than pure guesswork. No one can predict 
the future with any degree of certainty, not even the forecasters at Gold-
man Sachs, on whose uncertain calculations Jacques relies.24 Nor do those 
figures say anything about the human and environmental costs entailed 
by continued double-digit growth. On top of this, the country 's economic 
growth is unevenly distributed, and the financial system is under authori-
tarian control. The value of the Chinese currency is determined by a small 
circle of commissars, and the yuan does not constitute a realistic alternative 
to the dollar as a global reserve currency.25 
Equally rickety is the assumption that China's political development will 
be characterized by continued relative stability. Jacques does not devote 
much space to the many obvious problems facing today's Chinese lead-
e rs in the form of growing regional inequalities, nationalism,26 cormp-
tion, envirorunental damage, protests from the civilian population, fraction 
struggles within the Communist Party, and much more. He shows even less 
interest in the issue of whether it will be possible in the long run to combine 
a capitalist market economy with a political dictatorship. Historically, there 
has been a strong correlation between market economies and democracy. 
But Jacques does not problematize the social tensions that China 's pecul iar 
form of "authoritarian capitalism" may lead to. Instead, he predicts- in 
vague and general terms-that Chjna will probably become " increasingly 
democratic" over time and that this development will be influenced not by 
the western example but rather by the country's Confucian tradition. But we 
23 Sec David Adam & James Randerson, "Secret Copenhagen recording reveals resistance from China and 
India," The Grumlicm, May 8, 2010. 
24 Cf. Ferguson, Colossus, 260. 
25 Jacques, Wiren Cirino Rules rile World, 360, 387; Olle Wilstbcrg, "fordcl USA: Vartbr USA fo rtsatter att 
vara den dominerande nmktcn," lmenratio11ella studier, April, 2010. 
26 f'or a study of Chinese nationalism, see Henrielta Han-ison, Clri11a (London: Arnold, 200 I). 
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are not told much about what this "alternative model to the West" will look 
like and what the future role of the Communist Party might be.27 
Lack of freedom and political democracy is in fact China's Achilles ' heel 
and a major obstacle to full acceptance of the country by the rest of the world. 
There is a clear tendency in Jacques to underestimate or to quickly bypass 
not only the current and future social problems of the People's Republic but 
also some dark chapters of the country's history. Mao Zedong plays a very 
obscure role in the book, and the disastrous Cultural Revolution is mentioned 
only a few times . The so-called "Great Leap Forward," which in the 1950s led 
to the worst stm·vation ctisaster in history, is not mentioned at all as far as I can 
see. The list of American sins and problems is long, on the other hand, with 
the aim of showing which of the nations is facing decline and ascendency, 
respectively. Jacques would have been more credible if he had kept his specu-
lative tendencies in check and presented a more realistic depiction of the two 
countries' strengths, weaknesses, and future prospects.28 
In area after area since its modernization, China has assumed the role of 
the world's second most 'powerful nation (or, as Jacques would say, civili-
zation). There is indeed no doubt that the U.S. and China are currently the 
two most powerful nations in the world and that their bilateral relations will 
leave an imprint on this century. 29 Unlike the EU or Japan, whose emer-
gence in the 1980s unleashed a minor flood of quickly forgotten books,30 
China has all the potential to become a future superpower. But it is not 
there yet, and it is improbable that the country will replace the U.S. as the 
dominant superpower in the foreseeable future. 31 Economically, politically, 
militarily, and culturally, the U.S. still has a marked advantage over the 
People's Republic, India, and other competitors. 
27 Johan Lagei-kvist, '17ie Limits of the China Model: Report from Co11fere11ce Proceedings 011 Authoritarian 
Capitalism (Stockholm : Glasshouse Forum, 2008); Jacques, When China Rules the World, 21 1-227, 395 
ff. (quotes on 395 and 397). See also Tony Saich, "China and the Unired Stares as Interacting Societies," 
in Richard Rosecrance & Gu Guoliang, eds., Power and Resll'ai111: A Shared \fisio11 for the U.S. - Cilina 
Relatio11ship (New York: Public Affa irs, 2009), 88 ff. 
28 See also Martin J acques, "Crouching Dragon, Weakened Eagle,'' The New York '/Imes, February 17, 2010; 
Martin Jacq ues, "No Chance Against China: Google's defeat foretells the day when Beijing rules the 
world," Newsweek, January 16, 2010. 
29 Graham Allison, "Introduction: Keeping China and the United States Together," in Rosecrance & Guol-
iang, eels., Power and Restraint, xi f.; Lagerkvisl, Kina i globaliseri11ge11s mill, 165. 
30 See, for example, Lester C. Thurow, Head to Head: The Economic Baille Among Japan , Europe, and 
America (New York: Harper, 2003). 
31 Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers, 113 ff.; Zakaria, The Post-American World, 92 f. 
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To say this is not to say that the U.S. can sit back and rest on its laurels, 
or, least of all, to maintain that the superpower has no domestic troubles. 
Economically it is virtually inevitable that the country will gradually lose 
ground to a number of rising nations in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. 
The economic crisis hit the United States much harder than China, and the 
Chinese government's massive stimulus package, which was implemented 
swiftly without opposition from obstinate lawmakers, worked much better 
than the one passed by a reluctant U.S. Congress. Also, Congress and the 
White House face a series of difficult issues and problems that need to be 
addressed in the years ahead. But before we pursue that, I would like to 
point to two major advantages the U.S. has regarding the immediate future. 
The first advantage has to do with population trends and immigration, and 
the second with higher education and research. 
The U.S. is the country that has the most multifaceted population in the 
world among industrialized nations. The country was built up by the original 
inhabitants and immigrants, and thanks to a relatively high level of immi-
gration it is a young nation , with a median age that consistently lies under 
40 years. Here, too, estimates differ, but according to researcher Nicholas 
Eberstadt the U.S. population will grow by 65 million by 2030, which means 
that the number of children will continue to exceed the number of old people. 
Another scholar, Joel Kotkin, peers further into the future and estimates that 
the U.S. population will reach at least 400 million by 2050, an increase of 100 
million compared with today. The majority of the increment will consist of 
vmious minority groups, above all Asians and Hispanics. According to Kot-
kin, no other country will be characterized by such ethnic diversity. 
Analysts disagree about the exact numbers, but on one point they appear 
to agree: most countries in Europe and Asia are facing a growing problem 
stemming from stagnating populations, declining birth rates, and an unwill-
ingness to accept immigrants. Eberstadt estimates that by 2030 Europe will 
have twice as many people over 65 as children under 15, with drastically 
rising pension costs as a result and ever fewer gainfully employed people 
to foot the bill. Developments are calculated to be similar for Japan, Ko-
rea, and China, although estimates for the People's Republic are uncertain 
and contingent upon the country's future population policy. In many Asian 
countries- with the notable exception of India- the number of people em-
ployed will continue to diminish in coming decades. 
Rapid population increases are of great importance for a country's eco-
nomic vitality, prosperity, and employment. A nation with a youthful popu-
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lation structure and continuous immigration enjoys several advantages vis-
a-vis its competitors. It is interesting to note that the U.S. would have had 
the same low birth rate as Europe's aging democracies if it had been forced 
to rely solely on the domestic white population. 
The journalist Fareed Zakaria points out that without immigration, U.S. 
economic growth over the last quarter century would have been just as low 
as that of Ru rope, anct the head start in research and technological develop-
ment would have been considerably smaller. The accomplishments of the 
superpower are to a great extent a consequence of the continuous immigra-
tion of people who work (not seldom in substandard environments), build, 
save, spend, educate their children, and generally strive for a better life than 
what they left behind. Periodically there has been popular resistance to im-
migrants from certain countries, and the issue of illegal immigration today 
is an open wound. But the relatively open attitude toward people from other 
cultures has historically been a major strength of the U.S. and something 
that has distinguished the cou ntry from many other nations, including Chi-
na.32 
The U.S. has an even greater comparative advantage in its superiority in 
hi gher education and research. In rankings of the world's best universities, 
there is a striking U.S. dominance. In the two most often cited ranking lists, 
caITied out in China and the UK, respectively eight and seven of the ten 
most prominent universities are located in the U.S. If the list is expanded 
to include the 50 most distinguished institutions, 38 and 21, respectively, 
are American. If we focus on subjects in natural science, the dominance is 
even greater. Americans almost always win the greatest number of Nobel 
Prizes-in 2009, for instance, 9 of 14 Nobel laureates were American, 4 of 
them researchers who had immigrated and had their careers at U.S . univer-
sities. No other country attracts so many foreign students as the U.S., even 
though the numbers declined markedly following the events of September 
11 , 2001. 
China has undergone explosive growth also in higher education. The 
number of institutions has more than doubled in a decade, from 1,022 to 
2,263. The city of Xi' an alone, southwest of Beijing, has 47 un iversities 
32 Zakaria, The Post-American World, 195 IT.; Joel Kotkin, The Nexr Hundred Million: America in 2050 
(New York: Penguin, 2010), I ff.; James Fallows, " How America Can Rise Again," Tile Ar/011ric. January-
February, 20 I 0. For a discussion about the problems of racism in China. see Jacques, When Chinn Nu/es 
the World, 244-252, 256 ff. 
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and colleges that educate a steady stream of engineers. The Ch inese higher-
education system is the world's largest today, and the country issues more 
academic degrees than the U.S. and India combined. But these impressive 
figures tell us little about the quality of Chinese higher education, which is 
poor in many places. Approaches seem to be strictly quantitative, with the 
emphasis on rote learning and constant testing. Any ambition to become the 
world leader in research and education is clearly hobbled by a culture and 
a political system that counteracts any questioning and critical thinking. 33 
The Domestic Challenge 
The U.S. proves to be most vulnerable when it comes to dealing with prob-
lems at home, starting with the stmctural imbalances in the economy. Three 
heavy deficits need to be addressed sooner or later: one in the federal bud-
get, one in the balance of trade, and one regarding savings. Americans are 
nonnally dedicated consumers and prefer spending the ir money to saving 
it. Most problematic is the federal budget deficit, which grew drastically 
under George W. Bush and at the close of fiscal 2009 amounted to $1.4 
trillion, con-esponding to about 11 pe rcent of the country's gross domestic 
product (GDP). The budget deficit has not been so large since the days of 
World War II. 
Multiple factors have contributed to this portentous development. When 
he assumed office in 2001, Bush inherited a surplus in the federal budget on 
the order of $236 billion. Few remember it, but a great deal of the 2000 elec-
tion debate actually had to do with how the budget surplus should be spent. 
After Bush 's first term, the surplus had been transformed into a deficit of 
nearly $500 billion. This was partly a consequence of the high costs of the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the lion's share of the deficit was ascrib-
able to increased expenditures for health care and pensions, and above all to 
the massive tax cuts that were implemented in three steps during 2001-03. 
The first red uction of income taxes alone, in 2001 , is calculated to have cost 
the government budget $1.35 trillion over ten years. By contrast, President 
Obama's health care plan, which barely squeezed through a divided Con-
gress, is estimated to cost just over $900 billion over a ten-year period. It is 
33 Zakaria, T/Je Post-A111erica11 World, 187-195: Henrik Berggren, "Hcllrc f'ri 1in expert," Dage11s Nyilerer. 
Apri l 22, 2010; Keith Bradsher, "China Drawing High-Tech Research From U.S. ," T/1e Ne1v York Times, 
March 17, 20 10. 
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this explosion in expenditures, together with the consequences of the deep 
economic recession, that has Jed to today's gigantic budget de:ficit.34 
Estimates regarding future budgets and deficits are by necessity dodgy, 
but those carried out by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are usually 
viewed as relatively reliable. According to the CBO's projections, the total 
debt held by the public will increase from $5.8 trillion in 2008 to a massive 
$14.3 trillion in 2019, or from 41 to 68 percent of GDP. These predictions are 
based on assumptions about future population increases, economic growth, 
the cost of health care, and a number of other factors that, should they change, 
could adjust the figures upward or downward. But no future scenario indi-
cates that the total debt burden will diminish in the coming 30 years.35 
Economists in the Obama administration initially had a goal of shrinking 
the deficit to about three percent of GDP by the end of the president's first 
term. Later, when they realized that this was unrealistic, they put forward 
a revised goal of the deficit being 4.6 percent by fiscal 2013. But that goal 
is far from sufficient if the U.S. is to be able to straighten out its dismal 
finances and achieve a balanced budget. Even the most conservative esti-
mates indicate a continued great imbalance between federal income and 
expenditures. 
The growing mountain of debt has made the U.S. the world's largest 
debtor today and thereby dependent on Asian lenders, above all China, 
which currently owns about 13 percent of the superpower's bonds . Some 
60 percent of the People's Bank of China's foreign reserves consist of U.S. 
governmental and real-estate bonds. It is often pointed out that the two 
countries have thereby grown to be mutually dependent, with the U.S. de-
pending on continued loans from China to cover its operating expenses and 
with China dependent on the U.S. as a market for its wares and to maintain 
employment. Both countries are moreover highly dependent on fossil fuels. 
For example, the U.S. consumes about one quarter of the world's oil but has 
only some two percent of known oil reserves. 36 
But that is not the end of it. The U.S . also has a sizable deficit in its trade 
34 Ferguson, Coloss11s, xix, 268 f.; Jackie Calmes, "Promise to Trim Deficit ls Growing Harder Lo Keep," The 
New York Times, January 6, 2010. 
35 Niall Ferguson, "An Empi re at Risk," Newsweek, December 7, 2009, 27 f. 
36 Allan Larsson, "Mot en ny global ordning? USAs och Kinas vagar ut ur skuldfiilla, dollmialla och klimat-
fiilla" (Stockholm: Global utmaning, 2009), 6, 19; "Drill, but Not Everywhere," Tile Ne1v York Times, April 
I , 2010. 
114 American Studies in Scandinavia, 43:2, 2011 
with the rest of the world. The negative balance of trade has deepened dra-
matically since the late 1990s and amounted to more than $700 billion in 
2008. China, in comparison, had a surplus of $400 billion, an imbalance 
that has prompted prickly verbal exchanges between the countries ' lead-
ing politicians.37 One consequence of this deficit is that the federal govern-
ment's interest payments, according to the CBO, are expected to increase 
from 8 percent of federal income in 2009 to 17 percent in 2019. If interest 
rates iise and the economy experiences weak or no growth, then interest 
payments could quickly reach 20 percent. The historian Niall Ferguson 
points out that if a nation has to spend as much as a fifth of its revenues on 
debt service, it faces a serious problem. Investors will head for the hills, 
interest rates will skyrocket, and suddenly the whole economy will go into 
a tailspin. Political leaders will then have to choose between raising taxes 
or cutting costs for unemployment compensation, pensions, or health care. 
All options are unpopular, as is the proposal to raise the retirement age in 
a country that has a lower life expectancy than most industrialized nations. 
Niall Ferguson maintains that in such a financial emergency defense ex-
penditures nearly always have to be cut. According to the Pentagon 's cur-
rent plans, defense spending will drop from today's more than 4 percent of 
GDP to 3.2 percent in 2015 and 2.6 percent in 2028. Health care costs m·e 
calculated at the same time to continue to mount, despite the adoption of 
the new health care plan. Cost developments like these indicate an empire 
in dire straits. Unless those in power take proactive measures to resolve the 
looming debt crisis, the superpower will find it more and more difficult to 
stave off its competitors. There is a connection between the capacity of the 
U.S. to manage its government finances and its ability to maintain its posi-
tion as the world's leading military power.38 This is something that Barack 
Obama seems to be aware of. In May, 2010, when Obama presented his 
national security strategy, he defined it considerably more broadly than his 
predecessor did. Bringing down the huge budget deficit is crucial to the 
country's ability to maintain its position of power, according to Obama. His 
former chief economic adviser Lawrence H. Surruners has formulated the 
problem in a simple question: "How long can the world's biggest borrower 
remain the world's biggest power?"39 
37 "Handelsnyll fran Washington april 2010" (e-mail message, April 16, 20 10). 
38 Ferguson, "An Empire at Risk," 27 ff. 
39 David E. Sanger & Peter Baker, " New Security Strategy Focuses on Managing Threats," The New York 
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As if this were not enough, the mortgage crisis is still ravaging the real-
estate market, which was a major factor behind the outbreak of the financial 
cri sis in 2008. In that yeru· more than 1.7 million homes were foreclosed 
on, and in 2009 that figure rose to over 2 million. For 2010 the number of 
homes foreclosed or sold by executive auction was estimated to c limb to 2.4 
million, and this despite several federal programs designed to alleviate the 
situation for exposed homeowners. No fewer than 15 million homeowners 
are regarded as sti ll being in the risk zone- that many owe their bank more 
than their house is worth.40 
Add to this runaway economic crises in many U.S. states. California, 
New York, New Hampshire, Illinois, Connecticut, and Colorado are just a 
few examples of states whose budget statements today are largely as nega-
tive as that of Greece. Hawaii, for instance, has introduced four-day weeks 
in its public schools in a desperate effort to improve its finances. In the 
worst shape is California, the largest state in the country that, with its 37 
million inhabitants, has always been at the cutting edge of economic and 
technological development and long served as a magnet for bold and in-
novative entrepreneurs. Until now, that is to say- California is virtually 
bankrupt and is expected to post a budget deficit of about $2 1 billion for 
2010. With unemployment at L2 percent and draconic cuts in the budget for 
education and health care, immigration has stopped in the last few years . 
Between 2004 and 2008 half a million people left the state, a remarkable 
development considering California's history of large scale immigration.41 
Then we have the problems with financing Medicare, Medicaid, and So-
cial Security, which in the long run threaten to drain the already dwindling 
government coffers . In 2007 the first of some 77 million "baby boomers" 
started to collect their pensions. Soon after that they began to cash in the 
benefits that Medicare, that is, medical insurance for seniors, provides.42 
In Obama's budget for fi scal 2011 most expenditures-nearly $2.4 trillion 
in a budget totaling $3.8 trillion-go to Medicare, Medicaid (medical aid 
for the poor), Social Security, and interest payments on the national debt. 
Times, May 27, 2010; David E. Sanger, "Huge Deficits May Alter U.S. Politics and Global Power," ibid., 
February 2, 201 0 (quote). 
40 Peter S. Goodman, "U.S. Loan Effon ls Seen as Adding to Housing Woes," The Neiv York Times, January 
2, 2010. 
41 Mary Williams Walsh, "State Debt Woes Grow Too Big to Camouflage," ibid., March 29, 2010; Paul Har-
ris, "Will California become America's first failed state?," Tire Obsen •er Sunday, October 4, 2009. 
42 r erguson, Colossus, 270 ff. 
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Medicare and Medicaid al one will cost $788 billion.43 How these resource-
consuming federal programs are to be funded and constructed in the future 
is a problem that every administration since the 1980s has faced but that no 
one has seriously dared to tackle. 
The federal government has not idly watched these developments unfold. 
During George W. Bush's final months in the White House, the government 
went in and took over parts of the auto industry and the finance sector, mea-
sures that were not well received, especially among Republican grassroots. 
Barack Obama's first major move as the newly sworn-in pres ident was to 
get Congress to adopt a stimulus package of nearly $800 billion , a figure 
that many economists felt was on the smallish side if the economy was to 
quickly start to recover. However, the crisis package could not prevent the 
official unemployment rate from exceeding ten percent in 2009, to be com-
pared with 4.9 percent in December 2007.44 
In February 2010, Obama went on to sign an executive order enabling 
the appointment of a special commission tasked with submitting proposals 
on how to reduce the federal budget deficit over the long term. The com-
mission consisted of 18 members, l 2 of whom were members of Congress, 
6 from each party. It was co-chaired by the Democrat Erskine Bowles and 
the Republican Alan Simpson. When Obama presented the commission, 
he stated that unless something is done about the burgeoning deficit it will 
"hobble our economy, it will cloud our future, and it will saddle every child 
in America with an intolerable burden." The head of the Federal Reserve, 
Ben Bernanke, said in the same context that it was now up to the elected 
representatives in Congress to soon make the "hard choices" needed before 
the debt burden threatens growth and economic recovery.45 
A commission report was presented in December, 2010, and included 
a plan to cut $4 trillion from projected deficits over the coming decade. 
l t contained a mix of deep spending cuts and tax increases, including an 
overhaul of the tax code which would eliminate the$ I trillion a year in tax 
breaks for individuals and corporations. Eleven of the commission mern-
4 3 " Mr. Obama's New Budget," The New York Times, February 2, 2010. 
44 T he total U.S. unemployment rate, including those who are underemployed, who have gone from full- time 
to part-time jobs and who have given up looking for a joh altogether, is estimated to be around 17 percent. 
45 " Obama's Defici t Panel Chiefs: 'Staggering' Task Ahead," PBS NewsHour February 18, 2010 (quote); 
Jackie Calmes, " Obama Tells Debt Commission ' Everything Has to Be on the Table'," The New York 
Times, April 27 , 20 I 0 (quote); Jackie Calmes, "Deficit Hawk Returns, Much to His Party's Dismay," ibid., 
March 17, 2010. 
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bers supported the plan, three votes short of the 14-vote majority needed 
to send the proposals to Congress. Thus, the legislators did not have to 
make the "hard choices" about how to cut the deficit and reduce the debt. 
President Obama promised to study the commission's proposals c losely, 
but then quickly forgot about them.46 Instead of action there was stalemate 
and inaction. The same thing happened in late 2011 , when the so-called 
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (popularly referred to as the 
"Super Committee") failed to reach a bipartisan compromise on reducing 
the budget deficit and the debt. 
The failure of the key actors in Congress and the White House to deal 
with the country 's debt c1isis amply illustrates the strong polarization that 
prevails between the parties and politicians in today's Washington. The 
antagonism seems rather to have increased since Obama took office, not 
diminished as he pledged as a candidate. This is partially due to forces 
beyond his control, primarily the fact that the Republicans have generally 
pursued a strategy of deliberate obstruction. But Obama cannot avoid his 
part of the blame for developments, considering the fact that his entire 2008 
election campaign was about his changing the climate of confrontation in 
U.S. politics.47 
In the short and medium term, this combination of runaway budget defi-
cits, imbalances in the entitlement system, and the polarization of parties 
and politicians is a considerably graver threat to the supremacy of the U.S. 
than the rising economic powers elsewhere in the world. The acute danger 
comes from within, not from abroad.48 
Conclusion 
The pola1ization of the parties is a symptom of a larger problem, namely the 
fact that the U.S. political system is poorly equipped to deal with today's 
societa l problems. There is a huge gap between an old-fashioned constitu-
tional framework and a constantly changing world. The U.S. Constitution 
was rati fied in 1789, and even though it has been changed somewhat by 
its 27 amendments, its main features remain in place today. The House of 
Representatives has the same number of members in 2011 as it did in 1911 , 
46 Jackie Calmes, "Obama Offers Hope for Debt Panel's Plan," New York Times , December 3, 2010. 
47 Cf. Erik Asaru, "Obamas forsta !tr gav ojanrn skord," Svenska Dagbladet, January 20, 20 lO. 
48 Cf. Ferguson, Colossus, 28 f., 279. 
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although the population is now more than three times the si ze. In the Sen-
ate, largely the same outdated rules of debate and voting still apply. A party 
with 41 seats in the Senate can block all legislation, despite its minority sta-
tus. An individual senator can delay the president's appointments for weeks 
and months. To get anything done in the Senate, there needs to be a super 
majority consisting of 60 votes. 
The president is chosen not directly by the people but by an electoral col-
lege, perhaps the most anachronistic feature of the constitution. At least tlu-ee 
times-1876, 1888, and 2000-it has happened that the candidate who re-
ceived fewer popular votes was declared the winner.49 This result came close 
to being repeated in 2004, when John Kerry would have won in the e lectoral 
college if he had received some 60,000 more votes in the industrial state of 
Ohio. That is how close it was to a rerun of the 2000 election, this time with 
George W. Bush in the role of the loser even though more regular voters cast 
their ballot for him. And now, as then, the same two parties preside over the 
whole business, as tl1ey have done for as long as anyone can remember. 
"It could be argued," writes political scientist David McKay, "that Amer-
ican institutional arrangements, especially federa lism and the separation of 
powers, are ill su ited to the sort of efficient and effective policy-making 
needed in a modern industrial society."50 This is clearly noticeable in the 
legislators' inability to cross party boundaries to solve some of the burning 
social problems such as the energy issue and the great dependency on oil, 
environmental problems, health care costs, illegal immigration, and decay-
ing infrastructure. Anyone who has traveled through the landscapes of in-
dustrial ruins in the Midwest or driven across some of the country's many 
dilapidated bridges knows what it looks like in places. It has been calcu-
lated that it would cost $2.2 trillion over a five-year period to restore the 
nation 's bridges, roads, and dams to an acceptable standard, but only half 
of that stun has been pledged by the federal and state governments. This 
effort is urgently needed-the average life of a dam is 50 years, and more 
than 26 percent of all bridges are regarded as so frail that it is dangerous to 
drive on them.51 
49 Lawrence D. Longley & Neal R. Peirce, The Electoral Cullexe Primer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
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Many of the pioneering innovations in U.S . society were developed in 
fruitful collaboration between public institutions and private enterprise. 
This has included everything from the creation of public parks and a func-
tional transportation network through the development of the Internet and 
the GPS network to today's advanced medical and scientific research. In all 
these cases government has provided the investments and research grants 
whereas private companies have managed the exploitation and implementa-
tion. 
What is new about the present day is that government in the U.S. is be-
coming less and less capable of achieving the results and making the com-
mitments that are absolutely necessary if future inventions are to be created 
to help solve the problems of society. The country's civil society is still ex-
ceedingly active, but owing to all the deadlocks and antagonisms, the public 
institutions are no longer able to hold up their end of the partnership. How 
much longer will it be before a less and less functional government drags 
the private sector with it in a downward spiral?52 
Following the 20 10 congressional elections, the U.S. once again has a 
divided government, with one party controlling the White House and anoth-
er enjoying a comfortable majority in the House of Representatives and a 
strong minority position in the Senate. There is a great danger that the inca-
pacity to reach decisions and the stand-offs will be even more pronounced 
under divided government. It is this ingrained system, rooted in an outmod-
ed constitutional framework and aggravated by growing polarization that-
more than anything else-makes the United States a fragil e superpower. 
s2 er. ibid. 

